One of four essays written for Money, Markets, and Morals where I argue that, by combining the writings of Aristotle and Downs, one can make an argument for demoncracy being the best or least bad form of government.
What, according to Aristotle, is the purpose of political community? How does Aristotle’s view of politics differ from Downs’ “economic theory of democracy”? Whose view is more persuasive?
Why, according to Aristotle, is it necessary to reason about the purposes and ends appropriate to social practices? What are the implications of Aristotle’s view for the just allocation of jobs and social roles? (Consider, for examples, the jobs we have discussed.)
On what grounds does Aristotle distinguish between pleasure and happiness? What are the implications of this distinction for economic reasoning?
In modern countries, governments exert an enormous amount of influence on the lives of their citizens through means visible and invisible, direct and indirect. By nature, governments also wield a tremendous amount of power—sitting at the head of the table at any decision within their purview. As such, government could not possibly escape the interest of economists, who have posited many suggestions about the role government aught to (or aught not to) play in their domain. Economist Anthony Downs does not offer a normative opinion about the role government should play; instead, he uses a rational economic framework to theorize about how governments may function. Using the assumption that everyone inherently conforms to the self-interested behavior of the butcher, the brewer, and the baker , Anthony Downs offers a positive model. Downs proposes that this model can inform normative theories of government. In this paper, Downs’s economic theory of democracy is used to evaluate Aristotle’s conception of government, which has heavily influenced and shaped modern political theory. There appears to be tension between Aristotle’s view of government, as outlined in the Politics, and Downs’s assertions about human nature. This paper will examine the intersection between Aristotle’s theory and Downs’s model and determine that if both Downs and Aristotle are believed, then a democratic government is the best form of government as it is the best of the perverted constitutions identified by Aristotle that can possibly be achieved.
Downs outlines most normative theories as consisting of three parts: defining what goals are good, describing the behavior necessary to achieve those goals, and asserting that people “should” do these behaviors. If these behaviors are inconsistent with economically rational behaviors, then the theory should be reexamined, as it may be contradictory in nature. Aristotle offers one such normative theory of government that can be broken down into these components.
Government, according to Aristotle, is established to achieve the highest form of good—a logical conclusion derived from the belief that man’s purpose is to achieve good. Aristotle’s conception of good is derived from exercising virtue and reason, the two characteristics that humans uniquely possess. Good and virtue are distinct form economic wellbeing. That is, being wealthy is not equivalent to being good or virtuous. Economic wellbeing, Aristotle reasoned, was necessary in the business of politics, just as it is important in the business of the household, but it is not the ultimate purpose of the household or government. Without wealth, it is difficult to achieve good, just as it is difficult to weave without wool. But wealth is not the ultimate good, as natural wealth is limited—there is a limit to the natural needs. Furthermore, accumulating wealth for wealth’s sake is unnatural and not virtuous or good. Following this line of logic, governments are only in the business of ensuring that the natural needs of their citizens are met so that the citizens can focus on developing their virtues. Indeed, in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that “This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.” Governments exist more for the sake of ensuring life or economic well being, because these are possible without the state. Indeed, the goal of government is for the good life.
This is the first component of Aristotle’s view of government. Aristotle states that there are a couple of possible systems of government that can achieve these goals. Of the three forms of government, rule by one, the few, and the many, Aristotle identifies a good form and a perverted form. The key factor is that “governments which have a regard to the common interest are constituted in accordance with strict principles of justice, and are therefore true forms; but those which regard only the interest of the rulers are all defective and perverted forms.” The behavior necessary to achieve Aristotle’s goal is that the people who control government must have a regard to the common interest and have a concern with vice and virtue. If people who control the government are primarily concerned with their own financial well-being, then the government becomes perverted, unable to achieve the true goals of government.
It follows logically that, if the goal of government is the good life and if those with an interest for the common good should control governments, then society “should” give those with an interest for the common good the powerful positions in government. This is precisely the system that Aristotle advocates for. But Downs warns against the very assumption that Aristotle makes—that the system can assume that there exist people that are solely interested in the common good. Indeed, this is the central tenant of Downs’s model. He writes, “An axiom crucial to all the rest of our model. We assume that every individual, though rational, is also selfish. The import of this self-interest axiom was stated by John C. Calhoun…” The assumption that Aristotle makes is precisely the one Downs cautions against making. But Aristotle, having foreseen such aspects of human nature, does attempt to reconcile these risks into his theory.
Aristotle concedes that a government where many people rule is likely to be superior to that in which only one person or a few people rule, writing,
The principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best is one that is maintained, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to contain an element of truth. For the many, of whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse.
But even in acknowledging some benefit in the rule by the many, Aristotle still believes that such a rule can be perverted by self-interest, worrying that the poor majority would steal and plunder from the rich. Nonetheless, Aristotle recognizes the risk of a monarchy degenerating into tyranny, the worst kind of government, through the same mechanisms. As such, Aristotle advocates for a majoritarian rule, favoring to run a less extreme risk buffered by the distribution of power to the citizens.
It is evident that the warning Downs offers was considered by Aristotle when he formulated his theory of government long ago. Still, Aristotle’s beliefs emerge from a message of hope and not cynicism. Downs might cynically be interpreted in this context to imply that no form of just government (in Aristotle’s eyes) could be achieved, as self-interest stands as an impenetrable barrier. But Aristotle emphasizes, time and time again, the possibility of, through habit and learning, freeing people from their unnatural vices. Good, virtuous government, Aristotle extols, is possible but difficult to achieve. With warnings like the one Downs offers in his mind, Aristotle votes for democracy, the most realistic form of government, but is asking for something more than a system of government that might be characterized as a system of virtue.
The purpose of your essay is to examine some possible connections between Downs and Aristotle and you argue that, despite their differences, both favor democracy as the best possible government. You imply throughout the paper that despite Aristotle’s temporal remove from contemporary politics, his political thought is a welcomed addition to current conceptions, which are quite similar to Downs’ economic theory. You also indicate why preference for democratic governance is particularly tempting. The real question at hand is: how do we decide what to do with such a powerful institution?
But modern economic theories – as characterized by Downs’ positive model – make the assumption that people are self-interested and that governments ought to amalgamate and fulfill individual preferences without particular concern for a “common good.” You might have included that one reason modern political thinkers make the self-interested assumption is because Aristotle’s concern for the common good seems, to many, to be overly risky of subverting individual rights to “the community” or to the state. Moreover, inequalities in virtue are antithetical to democratic sensibilities – and we don’t take the possession of virtue to be a strong enough claim by its self for one’s “fitness” for rule.
You go on to write that even Aristotle himself acknowledges limitations to his political theory and concedes that in practice rule by the people might be the best form of governance. You might have indicated some more problems with governance by the best. For instance, there is no guarantee that the best would be inclined to rule, or you might have a population where “the best” isn’t really that “good” to begin with. Moreover, when the few who rule are corrupted, they tend to make the absolute worst rulers. This is why the corruption of monarchy is tyranny, Aristotle writes. But the problem with democratic governance, from Aristotle’s point of view, is that it prioritizes narrow self-interest over, what could be, more significant long-term interests of the common good. But given the problems of rule by the few, Aristotle half-heartedly endorses a majoritarian view, as you write, “favoring to run a less extreme risk buffered by the distribution of powers to the citizens.” In particular, you might have said that Aristotle also favors mixed government, which he calls “constitutional.” In addition, you might have included that the American political system is something of a compromise between the best and the people. The Senate, for instance, is supposed to be an “upper house” of sorts, while the House is the chamber of “the people.” Moreover, the judiciary is completely elitist. Etc. All of this is indication that the comparison of Aristotle’s and Downs’ political theories is more than just an academic exercise, but a very real consideration of the motives of political behavior and how it should be institutionalized.
It’s a good question to consider how much virtue can play in determining the outcomes of political governance. The question is how much does human agency itself play a role compared to the procedural and institutional rules and incentives. History indicates – quite a lot.